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pan-Muslim solidarity among women is an important path, but one fraught with internal challenges and external limitations.¹¹ We must address how bland constructions of liberal cosmopolitanism or a “feel-good” cosmopolitan discourse can obscure the politics of inequality and structures of power and subordination wrought through the related processes of globalization, in the way that “multiculturalism” has created the same illusory smoke screen hiding the hierarchies of racial power and privilege.

In the end, I feel lost in translation. The Muslimwoman industry has dissected my identity, pulled my subjectivity into fragments that I do not recognize (and which, like Humpty Dumpty, I need to piece back together), and at the same time, managed to reduce me to a singular trope. And so the struggle for agency and self-representation continues.

In conclusion, I leave you with these timeless words by our beloved thirteenth-century poet Jalaluddin Rumi, which best translate for me the inner struggle I feel as a Muslim woman unable to see myself reflected in the prism through which others filter their knowledge of me:

There is no edge to my vast desert;
There is no peace for my heart and my soul.
The world is taken, from end to end, by image and form;
Which of these images is mine?¹²

REJOINER TO “MUSLIMWOMAN” RESPONSES

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There are many situations, conditions, and identities that we recognize but cannot name. The lack of a name does not matter until it does; at that point, it becomes urgent to articulate succinctly what before had been dimly felt and poorly expressed. The process of naming is fraught: Does the name really explain anything? Does it have analytical value? Is it worth the effort of adopting a new name for what had long been nameless? Neologisms are routinely distrusted because they compel a rethinking of the familiar. Once coined, however, the name expands understanding and allows for new discursive structures. Take, for example, the designation of countries with sizeable Muslim populations or a history shaped by Muslims as Islamic. The term highlights religion at the expense of other factors. Tackling the problem linguistically, world historian

¹¹ See, for example, Maliha Chishti, “The International Women’s Movement and the Politics of Participation for Muslim Women,” in “Islam and Women,” ed. Jasmin Zine and Katherine Bullock, special issue, *American Journal of Islamic Social Science* 19, no. 4 (2002): 80–99.

¹² Rumi (Divan 239:1–4), <http://forums.muslimvillage.net/lofiversion/index.php/t2650-50.html>.

Marshall Hodgson invented a new word—*Islamicate*—that would question the centrality of religion in the identification of such societies but would not eliminate it. In so doing, he separated religious from cultural and social effects even while holding on to their imbrication with one another. Hodgson's neologism enabled an epistemic shift; it redefined the ways in which knowledge about Muslim societies might be produced.¹

In an attempt to make sense of a growing problem confronting Muslim women, I too have coined a neologism—*Muslimwoman*. My concern was to find a way to draw attention to the post-9/11 collapse of religion and gender into a singular and imposed political category. I wanted to highlight the ways in which non-Muslims and Muslim religious extremists alike deploy this newly entwined religious and gendered identification. The Muslimwoman is useful also for those Muslim women who recognize a strategic utility to this essentialist identity. The test of the effectiveness of neologisms like *Islamicate* and *Muslimwoman* is that they are so relevant that they impose themselves.

My goal in combining *Muslim* and *woman* into one was to emphasize how these two words have collapsed into each other. *Muslimwoman* is both a noun and an adjective that refers to an imposed identification the individual may, but generally does not choose for herself. In the Derridean sense, it is an iteration whose repetition does not simply “produce a replica of the first original usage and its intended meaning; rather every repetition is a form of variation, . . . a linguistic, legal, cultural and political repetition-in-transformation.”² The Muslimwoman is not an “archetype”; nor is it an “ontological status,” as Zine asserts. It is not a description of any kind of reality that should be inflected by class or ethnicity; it is the ascription of a label that deliberately and strategically reduces all diversity to a single image, generally that of the veiled woman. The veil, real or imagined (because the unveiled woman is often thought to be the exception that proves the rule that all Muslim women are veiled), functions like race, a marker of essential difference that many women in both Muslim-majority and -minority societies find hard to escape.

Although Badran questions my claim that 9/11 had a significant impact beyond the West, I maintain that it did. The tragedy of 9/11 and the catastrophic “war on terror” it unleashed have reached Muslim populations from the Middle East to Central, South, and Southeast Asia. It was 9/11 that allowed Western states to other their Muslims so that many now live in their birth nations as guests at best and parasites at worst. In the United States and Europe, the surge in Islamophobia since 9/11 has redrawn boundaries of citizenship. Second- and third-generation Muslims find themselves having to justify belonging to places and communities into which they were born.

¹ Marshall Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974).

² Seyla Benhabib, *The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 179, 180.

"I am as American as you are," said one of the panelists at last summer's Aspen Institute seminar on Muslim women. The white audience smiled indulgently: "How articulate she is! How smart *these* Muslim women are!"

When I pinpointed 9/11 as a turning point in attitudes toward Muslim women, my intention was not to claim that their stigmatization is new. Not at all. The point, rather, was to understand how such an apparently foundational notion could take off so quickly. The idea was already there, but it needed a trigger. September 11 was the key moment in the global consciousness and diffusion of the idea of the Muslimwoman.

Does the Muslimwoman category appear only in the United States and Europe? My contention is that it functions globally. While Moallem has called for a distinction to be made between the situation of Muslim women in the West and in Muslim-majority countries, she acknowledges the ironic collaboration I have noted between Western imperialists and Muslim nationalists (I refer to religious extremists) in desubjectifying Muslim women. However, I believe that regardless of whether it is non-Muslims in Europe and the United States or religious extremists in Iran who invoke the Muslimwoman, their goal is the same: management of Muslim women. For sociologist Bryan Turner, the goal of religious management is to reassert authority over any who "seek to articulate an alternative vision of power and truth."³ Judith Butler reminds us that managing people "is to constitute them as the less than human without entitlement to rights, as the humanly unrecognizable. . . . 'Managing' a population is thus not only a process through which regulatory power produces a set of subjects. It is also the process of their de-subjectification."⁴ The process is contradictory: subjects are produced only to be desubjectified. I am interested in the ways that post-9/11 Muslim women, living across multiple borders, are contesting desubjectification while creating Muslimwoman cosmopolitanism.

Muslimwoman cosmopolitans are opening a moral conversation about human dignity, universal respect, and practices of inclusion and exclusion. Strategically mobilizing the essentialist Muslimwoman label, they can connect with each other across frontiers of all sorts and destabilize roles they are expected to play as border markers for their communities. This ambivalent location intensifies awareness of multiple, overlapping allegiances, of cultural hybridity, and of a common cause that makes their voices possible.

Muslimwoman visions of global justice and postnational solidarity are part of what Seyla Benhabib calls "cosmopolitan citizenship," which

³ Bryan Turner, "Managing Religions: State Responses to Religious Diversity," *Contemporary Islam* 1/2 (2007): 123–27, quotation on 124–25.

⁴ Judith Butler, *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence* (London: Verso, 2004), 98.

entails not so much a political practice as a moral attitude of not placing the affairs and concerns of one's immediate community ahead of those others who may be strangers to us. . . . A cosmopolitan perspective takes as its starting point the Kantian view that, "if the actions of one can affect the actions of another," then we have an obligation to regulate our actions under a common law of freedom which respects our equality as moral agents. The consequences of our actions generate moral obligations; once we become aware of how in fact they influence the well-being and freedom of others, we must assume responsibility for unintended and invisible consequences of our individual and collective doings (even while) becoming aware of the regulatory and interventionist measures of world governing bodies.⁵

⁵ Benhabib, *Rights of Others*, 73, 95, 104.